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as long as the performance is not broadcast in its entirety. The state of the
law in appropriation cases is as unsettled now as it was before the instant
case, and perhaps even more so due to the "entire act" test and the
confusion over what type of damage is suffered. It appears that Judge
Biggs' haystack in a hurricane has been hit with a fresh burst of wind.
James N. Mansfield HI
APPELLATE REVIEW OF DAMAGE AWARDS-AN AFFIRMATION
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S "MUCH DISCRETION"
While operating a dado saw at his place of employment, plaintiff cut
off four fingers and a large part of his right hand. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision requiring the employer's
parent corporation and its insurer to pay $350,000 in damages,' but on
rehearing reduced the award to $140,000.2 The Louisiana Supreme Court
reinstated the trial court's award and held that courts of appeal should
modify an award for damages upon a showing that the trial judge or jury
abused its discretion in setting the amount but "only to the extent of
lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point which is reason-
ably within the discretion afforded that court." Coco v. Winston Indus-
tries, Inc., 341 So. 2d 332 (La. 1976).
Louisiana courts have consistently adhered to the constitutional man-
date for courts of appeal to review quantum of general damages awarded
by the trial court. 3 The Louisiana Supreme Court has also consistently
upheld the rule of Civil Code article 1934(3) that the judge or jury must be
given much discretion in setting awards and has held that the rule does not
violate the Louisiana Constitution. 4 To strike a balance between these two
1. Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 667 (on rehearing).
3. LA. CONST. art. V, § 10(B): SCOPE OF REVIEW
Except as limited to questions of law by this constitution, or as provided by law
in the review of administrative agency determinations, appellate jurisdiction of
a court of appeal extends to law and facts.
See, e.g., Temple v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 So. 2d 891 (La. 1976); Boutte v.
Hargrove, 290 So. 2d 319 (La. 1974); Watts v. Town of Homer, 301 So. 2d 729 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974). See also Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163, 165 n.1 (La.
1975) for a brief recap of the evolution of appellate review of fact in Louisiana.
4. See, e.g., Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351,
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grants of authority, the supreme court and the courts of appeal have held
that "appellate review of awards for general damages is limited to deter-
mining whether the trial court abused its discretion." 5 To determine
whether the trier of fact abused its discretion, courts of appeal must
352 (La. 1974); Miller v. Thomas, 258 La. 285, 288-92, 246 So. 2d 16, 17-18 (1971);
Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 257, 43 So. 2d 599, 600 (1949), all construing La.
Const. of 1921, art. VII, § 29(2) which provided:
All appeals of which the courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction as pro-
vided in this section shall be on both the law and the facts, except where the
appeal is limited to questions of law only by any other Section of this Constitu-
tion.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(3) provides in part:
Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of the loss the
creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been deprived, yet there
are cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating altogether on
the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party ....
In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of
offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to
the judge or jury, while in other cases they have none. . . . (Emphasis added).
The rationale for this rule of article 1934(3) is that the trial court finder of fact
has a direct encounter with the parties and witnesses to the suit and thus can
evaluate the true extent of plaintiff's injury, whereas the court of appeal must base
its decision solely on the written record of the case, briefs and oral argument. See,
e.g., Revon v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 257, 258 (La. 1974);
Palmer v. Avalon Oil Co., 120 So. 781, 783 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929); Redwitz v.
Waggamen, 33 La. Ann. 26, 28 (OrI. App. 1881).
Courts in other jurisdictions hold that the trial judge or jury is given great
discretion and that their verdict must stand unless it is so excessive or inadequate
that the judgment appears to have been the result of passion, prejudice, partiality,
corruption, or error of law. These decisions also give great weight to the trial
court's personal encounter with the parties and witnesses. This is especially true
since in other jurisdictions courts of appeal do not have power to review findings of
fact. See generally Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418, 423, 425 (8th
Cir. 1962); Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., I Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 622 (1974)(In Bank);,Spicer v. Armco Steel Corp., 68 Ohio App. 2d 314, 322
N.E.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1974).
5. Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351, 352 (La.
1974). See also Revon v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 257, 258 (La.
1974); Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 294 So. 2d 803, 809 (La. 1974); Boutte
v. Hargrove, 290 So. 2d 319, 321 (La. 1974); Ballard v. National Indem. Co., 246 La.
963, 970-71,169 So. 2d 64, 67 (1964); Averett v. Alexander, 336 So 2d 227, 232 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1976).
General damages are defined in Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory Inc.,
304 So. 2d at 352 as "[t]hose which may not be fixed with any degree of pecuniary
exactitude but which, instead, involve mental or physical pain or suffering, incon-
venience, the loss of gratification of intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other
losses of life or lifestyle which cannot really be measured definitively in terms of
money ......
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examine all the relevant evidence in the case and decide whether the
damage award conforms to the facts. 6 Courts of appeal may not modify
awards of damages simply because they disagree with the amount awarded
by the trial court7 or because the facts justify a different amount. 8 Only
upon finding that the judge or jury abused its "much discretion" can the
court of appeal raise or lower the amount of damages awarded.9 However,
when modifying trial court awards of quantum, courts of appeal often have
simply substituted their judgment for that of the trier of fact. ' In making
this substitution the courts of appeal have stated only that the judge or jury
abused its discretion and that a more appropriate amount should be
awarded. "
A survey of quantum in previous similar cases had been held to be an
appropriate aid to the courts of appeal in deciding whether the trial court
abused its discretion in setting the award. 2 This use of similar awards
originated in early decisions which required some uniformity of awards in
cases presenting similar fact situations.' 3 Following this principle, trial
court damage awards were often reduced or increased to maintain uni-
6. See, e.g., Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351,
352 (La. 1974); Bitoun v. Landry, 302 So. 2d 278, 279 (La. 1974); Revon v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 257, 258 (La. 1974).
7. Bitoun v. Landry, 302 So. 2d 278, 279 (La. 1974).
8. Revon v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 257, 258 (La. 1974);
Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 294 So. 2d 803, 809 (La. 1974).
9. See, e.g., Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d at 352;
Bitoun v. Landry, 302 So. 2d 278, 279 (La. 1974); Miller v. Thomas, 258 La. 285,
292, 246 So. 2d 16, 17-18 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Sanders v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 337 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1976) (reduced from $7500 to $5000); Sticker v. General Foods Corp., 324 So.
2d 568 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (reduced from $5000 to $1500); Allen v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) (increased from $12,000 to
$22,000).
11. See, e.g., Sanders v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 337 So. 2d 286, 288 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1976) ("the award to [plaintiff] of $7,500 for her personal injuries
constituted an abuse of discretion and we reduce this amount to $5,000. ... );
Curry v. Vallot, 271 So. 2d 711, 713 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) ("we are of the opinion
• . . that a reasonable award for such injuries, pain and discomfort is $4,750.00");
Allen v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 69,73 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) ("we
think that an award of $22,000 would be more equitable and would neither be
excessive nor inadequate").
12. See, e.g., Miller v. Thomas, 258 La. 285, 292, 246 So. 2d 16, 17-18 (1971);
Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 266, 158 So. 2d 149, 158 (1963); Miller v. Rooks,
256 So. 2d 499, 500 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
13. See, e.g., Williams v. W. R. Pickering Lumber Co., 125 La. 1087, 1099, 52
So. 167, 172 (1910) ("some reasonable uniformity in the awards in like cases should
be observed"); Rice v. Crescent City R.R., 51 La. Ann. 108, 115, 24 So. 791, 794
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formity with awards in preceding similar cases.14 This standard of uni-
formity was dominant in the early 1900's but declined in use until 1963,1"
when in the case of Gaspard v. LeMaire,16 the supreme court noted that
too many damage awards were modified "solely for the purpose of
maintaining uniformity of awards." 17 The court concluded that courts of
appeal were placing too much emphasis on prior awards and held that
previous awards should thereafter be used only as an aid in determining
whether the trial judge or jury had abused its discretion.18
In the instant case, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court on
original hearing, having found no abuse of discretion in establishing
quantum.' 9 However, on rehearing, after examining awards in previous
cases with similar facts, the court reduced the award from $350,000 to
$140,000.20 Finding that courts in previous cases had awarded smaller
amounts for similar injuries, the court of appeal determined that the trial
court had abused its discretion and lowered the award to what, in its
judgment, was a more appropriate amount. 2'
Finding no abuse of discretion by the trier of fact, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reinstated the original damage award 22 and expressed its
dissatisfaction with the appellate court's method of modifying damage
awards. After the supreme court recognized the trial court's "much
(1899) ("a due regard . . .being always had to the proper observance of a rea-
sonable uniformity ..... "); Grissom v. Heard, 47 So. 2d 108, 109 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1950) ("we do endeavor to maintain some standard of uniformity .... ").
14. See, e.g., Jones v. Tremont Lumber Co., 139 La. 616, 71 So. 862 (1916);
Williams v. W. R. Pickering Lumber, 125 La. 1087, 52 So. 167 (1910); Rice v.
Crescent City R.R. Co., 51 La. Ann. 108, 24 So. 791 (1899); Grissom v. Heard, 47
So. 2d 108 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950). J
15. Early cases stated emphatically that a standard of uniformity should be
maintained. See Jones v. Tremont Lumber Co., 139 La. 616, 71 So. 862 (1916);
Williams v. W. R. Pickering Lumber Co., 125 La. 1087, 52 So. 167 (1910); Cavicchi
v. Gaiety Amusement Co., 173 So. 458 (Orl. App. 1937); Jones v. Toye Bros. Auto
& Taxicab Co., 119 So. 446 (Orl. App. 1928). Later courts held that awards should
be uniform, but only so far as the particular facts and circumstances of each case
would allow. See Casserino v. Brown, 144 So. 2d 608, 609-10 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962); Grissom v. Heard, 47 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950); Hare v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., I So. 2d 439 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1941).
16. 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963).
17. Id. at 264, 158 So. 2d at 158.
18. Id. See also Note, 25 LA. L. REV. 545 (1965); Note, 49 TUL. L. REV. 460
(1975).
19. Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
20. Id. at 673-75.
21. Id.
22. 341 So. 2d at 337.
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discretion" in awarding general damages2 3 and the constitutional mandate
of courts of appeal to review these awards, 24 it set out new guidelines for
courts of appeal to follow in modifying general damage awards. The
primary change is to prohibit a court of appeal from simply substituting its
judgment on quantum for that of the trial court.25 Courts of appeal may
still modify an award of damages only after a finding that the trier of fact
abused its discretion, but "only to the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to
the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discretion
afforded that court.' '26
The court expressed concern that courts of appeal had disregarded the
standard formulated in Gaspard v. LeMaire27 and had placed too much
emphasis on awards in similar cases to decide whether a trial court had
abused its discretion.2 8 Although the court in Coco recognized the over-
reliance on previous similar cases, it did not prohibit their use as an aid in
determining whether the fact finder abused its discretion in setting quan-
tum. The court restated the Gaspard rule and warned courts of appeal
against relying too greatly on previous awards since each case must be
decided on its own facts. 29
Cases after Coco indicate a general dissatisfaction with the deci-
23. Id. at 335.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. This rule enunciated by the Louisiana Supreme Court closely resembles
the "maximum recovery rule" of the federal courts. In Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 138 (E.D. La. 1974), the court stated, "This rule directs
the trial judge to determine whether the verdict of the jury exceeds the maximum
amount which the jury could reasonably find and if it does, the trial judge may then
reduce the verdict to the highest amount that the jury could properly have awarded.
Functionally, the maximum recovery rule both preserves the constitutionally pro-
tected role of the jury as finder of facts and prevents the predilections of the judge
from infecting the jury's determination. Thus, the court's task is to ascertain, by
scrutinizing all of the evidence as to each element of damages, what amount would
be the maximum the jury could have reasonably awarded."
27. 245 La. at 264-66, 158 So. 2d at 158; see also text at notes 16-17, supra.
28. 341 So. 2d at 335. See, e.g., Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 333 So. 2d
395, 408 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) ("A consideration of the most recent cases where
catastrophic damage awards were made leads us to conclude that the general
damage award to Villere is excessive."); Hoffman v. Allstar Ins. Corp., 288 So. 2d
388, 395 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) ("considering recent cases emanating from this
Court . . . the sum of $5000 would fairly and justly compensate Hoffman");
Tamplain v. Collinswood Poultry Co., 279 So. 2d 277, 280 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973)
("With the pain and suffering associated with plaintiff's headaches discounted, it is
apparent that the damages awarded constitute an abuse of discretion.").
29. 341 So. 2d at 335.
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NOTES
sion. 30 Several opinions considered Coco to have given the trial court too
much discretion in establishing quantum and thus to prevent effective
review. 31 In one case, 32 the Fourth Circuit indicated that Coco was
irreconcilable with the constitutional mandate that courts of appeal review
trial court awards of damages. However, Coco correctly applied the rule
of Civil Code article 1934(3), that much discretion be given to the judge or
jury in setting damages. Thus to find Coco's requirement of much discre-
tion unconstitutional would logically require concluding that article
1934(3) is unconstitutional. However, Civil Code article 1934(3) has
consistently been upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court. 33
Another aspect of Coco that has met with dissatisfaction is the
requirement that courts of appeal first determine a reasonable range of
quantum and then modify the award accordingly if it does not fall within
that range.34 Some opinions suggested that the courts of appeal did not
fully understand how to set the limits of a reasonable award. 35 Yet these
same courts had no difficulty in the past in substituting awards which they
deemed more appropriate than those granted by the trial courts .36 Osten-
sibly the mental processes are the same for setting up a reasonable range of
awards and for determining the most appropriate award or for making any
other value judgment which requires "drawing the line" at some particu-
lar point.
Limiting the appellate court's power to modify the award only to the
lowest or highest reasonable figure protects the discretion of the judge or
jury by requiring more than a mere substitution of judgment on the part of
the courts of appeal. Arguably, when a trial court has clearly abused its
30. See, e.g., Gaudet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1977); Carollo v. Wilson, 345 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 4th Cir.), quantum modified, 353
So. 2d 249 (La. 1977); Smith v. Taylor, 343 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); See
also Marcus, J., dissenting in Schexnayder v. Carpenter, 346 So. 2d 196, 200 (La.
1977).
31. See the cases cited in note 30, supra.
32. Gaudet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d 333, 336 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
33. See text at note 4, supra.
34. See, e.g., Gaudet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1977); Carollo v. Wilson, 345 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 4th Cir.), quantum modified, 353
So. 2d 249 (La. 1977); Sanders v. Hall, 345 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
35. Carollo v. Wilson, 345 So. 2d 601, 604 (La. App. 4th Cir.), quantum
modified, 353 So. 2d 249 (La. 1977). See also Gaudet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 346 So. 2d
333 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Sanders v. Hall, 345 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1977). But see Andrepont v. Naquin, 345 So. 2d 1216 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977);
Kidder v. Anderson, 345 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
36. See the cases cited in notes 10-Il, supra.
1978]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
discretion, that discretion is no longer deserving of protection. 37 It seems
that the supreme court's concern in Coco is based on cases where the trial
court award has been modified by a proportionally small amount .1 It
seems clear that when the court of appeal reduces or increases the trial
court award by only a very small amount, it is ignoring the much discre-
tion given the trial court by article 1934(3). Thus, the rule set out in Coco,
by forcing the courts of appeal to set up a reasonable range of damages,
should ensure a finding that the judge or jury did in fact abuse its discretion
before modification of quantum is effected.
The procedure to be followed by the courts of appeal when they
review quantum is substantially the same as prior to Coco. The courts of
appeal must still examine all the evidence to determine whether it supports
the trial court award39 and may modify the award only upon finding an
abuse of discretion by the trial court, not merely because the court of
appeal finds another amount to be more appropriate.' Coco changes the
law by requiring less emphasis to be placed on awards in previous similar
cases, 41 and by forbidding the court of appeal merely to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court. 42 Although these are important
changes, Coco does not remove the power of review of the courts of
appeal, but rather explicitly affirms that power. 43
The thrust of Coco is to assure respect for the legislative policy
placing much discretion in the trier of fact. The case serves to strike a
balance between trial courts and courts of appeal with regard to setting the
amounts of damage awards, and in doing this promotes "the proper
allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective
courts."' The decision gave a somewhat more difficult standard for the
37. Instances of these clear abuses are found in cases where the trial court's
award has been modified by a large amount. See, e.g., Hebert v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
245 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) (award reduced from $25,000 to $5,000);
Reeder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d I I I (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (award reduced
from $200,000 to $120,000); Poche v. Frazier, 232 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970) (total pain and suffering award for six plaintiffs reduced from $300,000 to
$119,500).
38. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 240 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1970) (award increased from $1500 to $2500); Rogers v. Great American Ins.
Co., 220 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969) (awards reduced from $3000 to $2000
and from $1500 to $750); Milano v. Saia, 205 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968)
(award reduced from $3000 to $2000).
39. 341 So. 2d at 335.
40. Id. at 335.
41. See text at notes 26-29, supra.
42. See text at notes 24-25, supra.
43. See text at note 24, supra.
44. Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716, 724 (La. 1973).
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courts of appeal to meet before modifying an award of the trial court, but
since the judge or jury is in the better position to evaluate actual damages,
this is the better standard.
Ernest L. Nix, Jr.
THE POST-KA7Z PROBLEM OF
WHEN "LOOKING" WILL CONSTITUTE SEARCHING
VIOLATIVE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Several days after receiving a phone call from defendant Fearn's
neighbor concerning his observation of some strange looking plants in
Fearn's back yard, the police went to the neighbor's home to determine
what the plants were. A deputy testified that he could identify the plants as
marijuana while standing on the neighbor's property. After arresting the
defendant, the deputy went to the back yard and seized the plants. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the plants as having been
unconstitutionally seized. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed and
held that the fourth amendment guarantee' against unreasonable seizures
was violated since the plants were in an area in which the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and that their warrantless seizure could
not be justified by any exception. State v. Fearn, 345 So. 2d 468 (La.
1977).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that individuals shall "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. "2 Many courts used
1. The court cited the "right to privacy" in article I, section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 as a basis for its decision, but based its arguments solely on the
United States Constitution. State v. Fearn, 345 So. 2d 468, 469 (La. 1977). Art. I, § 5
provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or inva-
sions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the
persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search.
Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of
this section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
1978]
